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This paper contributes to the debate on the role of internal auditing in the public sector by focusing on 
the nature and practice of internal auditing in organisations that are subject to audit by the General 
Audit Bureau. Archival and documentary analysis, supported by 29 semi-structured interviews revealed 
that the underpinnings of the Saudi Internal Audit Regulation did not tie in directly with perceived 
international best practice - the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal 
Auditing. Institutional factors are also likely to play a part in terms of the existence of the state-required 
‘Follow-up department’ in all organizations, tasked with performing investigation and inspection, the 
‘auditing department’ (which monitors the propriety of transactions and accounting), and the work of 
the mandatory ‘Financial Representative (Controller)’. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In the broader context of governance and control, in-
creasing importance has been attached to the internal 
auditing function (Prawitt et al., 2008), and questions as 
to its effectiveness in discharging its responsibilities are 
being asked with greater frequency. Indeed, the various 
corporate scandals, coupled with the recent worldwide 
financial crisis have fuelled debate on whether internal 
auditing is being performed appropriately, not only in 
terms of ensuring compliance with the range of controls 
to which organizations are subject, but also in respect of 
its role in risk management, much more recently 
assumed by the function. In consequence, the regulatory 
framework has demanded greater disclosure of gover-
nance information, and internal audit function (IAF) has 
risen to this challenge, adopting an enhanced focus on 
corporate governance processes generally. Without 
doubt, IAF is inextricably linked with governance, given 
its role within the organization, and should therefore, be 
capable of responding to all regulatory requirements 
effectively. 
However, the IAF is not developed to  the  same  extent 
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in all organizations. For example, in Australia, a large 
number of listed firms either do not operate any IAF at all, 
or employ only one or two staff for this activity (Goodwin 
and Kent, 2006; Carey et al., 2000). And in the United 
States, Nagy and Cenker (2002) found that where the 
IAF is in evidence, its character differs substantially, 
appearing in its traditional role in some organizations, 
whilst assuming risk management and consultancy 
operations in others, and taking a middle road elsewhere. 
Moreover, there is evidence (Maher and Akers, 2003) 
that CEOs in America do not generally want internal audit 
involvement in the development of organizational 
systems. Clearly, the influence of senior management is 
a determining force in the scope of the IAF, as noted by 
Sarens and De Beelde (2006b), reporting on Belgian 
firms. 
In the Saudi Arabian context, internal audit has tradi-
tionally concentrated on the propriety of transactions and 
accounting, and indeed until 2004, there was no legal 
requirement for such a function to exist. However, with 
the issue of Resolution No 235 (2004), all organizations 
that are subject to audit by the General Audit Bureau 
(GAB) are required to establish an IAF. Nonetheless, 
currently, there are still many large organizations that 
have not complied  with that  directive, and  are operating  
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without IAF (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2012).  
Against this background, this paper explores current 
practice of IAF in Saudi Arabia‟s public sector organi-
sations, with the intention of determining the present 
state of internal auditing in the public sector, and how its 
performance is influenced. This involves a consideration 
of the development of internal auditing in Saudi Arabia, 
concentrating on the competence of the internal audit, 
independence and objectivity of internal audit, manage-
ment support for internal audit, internal audit activities, 
and interaction between audited organisations and 
external auditors (as performed by the GAB). The paper 
contributes to the understanding of the nature and 
characteristics of the IAF by empirically exploring these 
aspects of the function in the Saudi Arabian context. 
Previous studies into the role of audit and internal audit in 
Saudi Arabia have largely been focused toward the 
private sector (Al-Shetwi et al., 2011; Al-Twaijry et al., 
2004; Woodworth and Said, 1996; Asairy, 1993) and to 
date there has been few systematic academic enquiry 
into the role of internal audit in the public sector (Alzeban 
and Gwilliam, 2012). Given the dominance of the public 
sector within the Saudi State and economy this research 
seeks to make a contribution to redressing this 
imbalance. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section 
presents the development, in general, of internal audit in 
Saudi Arabia, and the manner in which it was established 
in the public sector. A summary of the related literature 
appears in the section thereafter, and the paper then pro-
ceeds to describe the nature of the research work 
conducted, including the rationale underlying the semi-
structured interview methodology utilised in the study. 
The main results of the interviews are subsequently 
described, and the final section provides an overview and 
conclusion. 
 
 
Saudi Arabia: internal audit background 
 
The development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia        
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a relatively recent 
development trajectory. Since oil was discovered in the 
1930s, its economy has gradually prospered, reaching 
the stage where it is now the largest oil supplier world-
wide. Indeed, the world‟s largest oil company, ARAMCO 
(Arabian American Oil Company) is wholly owned by the 
state, and despite a slight drop in oil revenues over 
recent years, they continue to account for over 75% of 
the state‟s income (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 
2009).  Accompanying this rapid economic growth has 
been a large and dominating public sector (characteristic 
of most developing countries), which operates according 
to a set of strong and deeply-rooted cultural beliefs 
underpinned by Islamic values and tribal relationships. It 
can   be   understood,   therefore,   that  ideas   regarding  
 
 
 
 
accountability and audit that have emerged in western 
economies are somewhat alien in the Saudi environment, 
but nonetheless, in the last few decades they have been 
introduced incrementally, and have spread since they first 
appeared in the banking sector and in very large 
companies (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003).  
The first IIA Chapter was formed in 1982 in Saudi 
Arabia, being in ARAMCO, with the purpose of increasing 
the number of IIA members, and supervising CIA 
examinations to allow internal auditors within the region 
to gain the CIA qualification (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003). 
Additionally, it aimed at encouraging good practice and 
disseminating information through such media as 
newsletters. The Chapter gained in size and operation, 
developing links with King Fahad University in Dhahran, 
and at the time of Al-Twaijry‟s study, there were appro-
ximately 75 members, a quarter of these being Saudi 
nationals. During its operation, the Chapter has suffered 
from resource shortages and legal limitations on the 
scope of its activities – but that said, it has been 
innovative in facilitating the uniform CIA examination in 
the Kingdom (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003). Now, as a result of 
the various efforts over the last 30 years to 
professionalise the IAF, the Council of Ministers has 
passed a resolution to establish the Saudi Institute of 
Internal Auditors (SOCPA, 2011). 
This came in the aftermath of Resolution No 235 
(2004), requiring all organizations to establish an IAF to 
be monitored by the GAB, and the subsequent Re-
solution No 129 (2007) containing additional guidance 
and addressing issues such as: the requirements and 
objectives of internal audit, recruitment of the head of 
internal audit and audit staff, responsibilities of the head 
of internal audit, scope of work, internal audit reports, 
relationship with other parties, and adherence to 
professional auditing standards. 
Not surprisingly, given the gradual acceptance of the 
IAF in Saudi Arabia, there has been some interest in this 
respect by scholars (Al-Shetwi et al., 2011; Al-Twaijry et 
al., 2004; Woodworth and Said, 1996; Asairy, 1993) but 
they have concentrated on the private sector, and very 
few researchers (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2012) have 
considered the IAF in public sector organizations. Clearly, 
this situation reflects a serious omission that should be 
rectified considering the fact that the Kingdom is 
dominated by the public sector. This study attempts to 
remedy that imbalance in literature. 
 
 
The resolution of 2004  
 
As already indicated, over the last quarter of a century, 
Saudi Arabia has developed considerably in all aspects, 
such that significant economic expansion has been 
witnessed. This is characterised by the increased 
involvement of the private sector, much diversification of 
activity,  significant business  activity  both within and out- 
 
 
 
 
side of the Kingdom, and an increased concentration and 
expenditure on development projects. Naturally, these 
levels of development have raised the appreciation of 
financial monitoring and reporting as crucial in all 
organisations since ultimately the country prospers or 
suffers according to the way in which its financial 
resources are employed. The GAB, with responsibility for 
financial oversight, recommended the establishment of 
IAF in all organisations that are subject to its audit, and 
as a logical outcome to that recommendation, Resolution 
No 235 issued in 2004 mandated all such organisations 
to establish an IAF. 
Commenting on the motivation for that resolution, Al-
Rahaily and Al-Zahrany (2007) highlighted several 
reasons for its issuance. An important one was the need 
to eliminate the corruption existing in public sector 
organisations and to reduce the number of errors, 
irregularities and fraud. Associated with this was the need 
to identify and remove weak internal control systems, and 
replace them with robust systems. Furthermore, the 
increased number and size of government organisations 
had led to additional government expenditures and 
greater complexity of transactions, all of which were too 
many for the GAB to monitor efficiently and effectively, 
given the Bureau‟s lack of qualified staff. Moreover, it was 
clear that some organisations did not take the IAF seriou-
sly, not being prepared to improve their financial errors 
and irregularities from one year to the next. Additionally, 
was the need to respond to the request from the 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI) to establish IAF in all public sector organi-
sations, and the growing awareness within the GAB of 
the importance of the need to provide a means to 
safeguard assets and public resources. 
 
 
The resolution of 2007 for the internal audit 
regulation  
 
In 2007, Resolution No 129 was issued in respect of the 
Internal Audit Regulation (IAR). According to Al-Rahaily 
and Al-Zahrany (2007), several steps were involved  in 
drafting the regulation before its final approval and 
release by the Council of Ministers in 2007. The first was 
the formation of a committee by the GAB President after 
the Resolution in 2004, to issue an IAR in collaboration 
with the Institute of Public Administration. The first draft of 
the draft of the regulation was issued in May 2005. This 
was followed in October (2005), when the King requested 
the GAB to re-consider the regulation in co-operation with 
four other bodies - the Institute of Public Administration, 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Civil 
Service (MCS), and the Investigation and Control Board 
(ICB). The next year (March 2006), the second draft was 
released and submitted to the King who in turn, referred it 
to the Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers. 
Finally,   in   2007,   the    Regulation   was   released   as  
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Resolution No 129. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Within the literature, there are different approaches to the 
exploration of IAF. In this study, the focus is on 
competence of internal audit, independence and object-
tivity of internal audit, management support for internal 
audit, internal audit activities and interaction between 
audited organisations and external auditors. 
 
 
Competence of internal audit 
 
The competence of all staff involved in the IAF is crucial, 
being clarified as a prime component of effective internal 
audit activity (IIA, 2006). Internal auditors must be 
sufficiently qualified, and in possession of all the requisite 
knowledge and skill to discharge the responsibilities 
associated with audit duties International Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (ISPPIA).  
Previous academic studies have focused on the need 
for personnel to be appropriately qualified if a high level 
of IAF is to be achieved (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2012; 
Vijayakumar and Nagaraja, 2012; Unegbu and Kida, 
2011; Ahmad et al., 2009). Internal audit quality is very 
much identified as reliant upon the competence, as 
demonstrated by qualifications and experience, of the 
auditors involved (Gramling and Hermanson, 2009; Zain 
et al., 2006). Moreover, two types of skill are suggested 
by Seol and Sarkis (2005) as being relevant, these being 
cognitive skills and behavioural skills. In the case of the 
former, the auditor is required to demonstrate technical, 
analytic, and appreciative skills, whereas in behavioural 
terms, it is essential that s/he has good interpersonal and 
organizational skills. These ideas are echoed by other 
scholars. For example, Harrington (2004) concentrates 
on paper qualifications, experience and IT skills, whilst 
Picket (2004) highlights the value of abilities in the 
cognitive domain (that is being focused, helpful, decisive 
and balanced). Not surprisingly, superior communication 
skills are pinpointed as crucial (Smith, 2005; Sawyer et 
al., 2003; Loss, 2000).  
 
 
Independence and objectivity 
 
The independence and objectivity of the IAF is also para-
mount. The ISPPIA and IIA Practice Advisory indicated 
that this can be achieved by: ensuring appropriate 
reporting mechanisms such that the internal audit depart-
ment has direct access to the Board and senior manage-
ment, by giving it the authority to access any records it 
deems fit, by allowing full access to all employees and 
departments, by placing strict conditions on the 
appointment  and removal of the  head of   internal  audit, 
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and by not undertaking non-audit work. Internal audit 
independence is challenged by the function being used 
as a stepping stone to other positions, by empowering 
the CEO or CFO to approve the IAF‟s budget and 
interfere with the internal plan, and implicitly, in the 
relationship between the internal audit manager and the 
audit committee (Christopher et al., 2009). The audit 
committee must be invested with the authority to appoint, 
dismiss and assess the performance of the internal audit 
manager. IAF should be treated and therefore, seen, as 
credible. In this respect, it was shown by Sarens and De 
Beelde (2006b) in their examination of the expectations 
and perceptions of senior management and internal 
auditors in Belgium, that objectivity is absent when the 
IAF operates mainly to support management, and when it 
has a weak relationship with the audit committee. Three 
factors have been suggested by Peursem (2005) as 
impacting upon internal auditors‟ ability to be independent 
from management, these being: their professional status, 
the presence of a formal and informal communication 
network, and the internal auditors‟ reporting position.  
Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) argue that internal auditors 
are highly influenced by their reporting position, and 
hence, a reporting hierarchy that includes senior mana-
gement is inappropriate. That said, Leung et al. (2004) 
observe that despite best practice suggesting chief 
internal auditors report to the audit committee, in 
Australia, more than 22% of a sample of such individuals 
were found to report to the CEO or CFO. This is clearly a 
poor national situation, since when reporting is to senior 
management rather than the audit committee, internal 
auditors are not able to protect the organization against 
fraudulent activities (James, 2003). In this circumstance, 
the close relationships between management and the IAF 
render the assurance of objectivity and independence 
extremely difficult (Glascock, 2002). Additionally, where 
internal auditors are in receipt of incentives-based com-
pensation, which include reported earnings as one 
measure of performance, their objectivity and indepen-
dence may well be hampered (DeZoort et al., 2000).  
 
 
Management Support for Internal Audit 
 
Irrespective of the need for internal auditors to have 
access to the audit committee, the IAF must nonetheless, 
interact with senior management on a close and regular 
basis since, the character of the function is determined 
completely by senior management‟s resource allocated to 
it, and the support and credence it gives to the role of 
organization-wide. Additionally, the involvement of senior 
management in formulating the work plan is both neces-
sary and unavoidable (a requirement of the ISPPIA), 
since it is through top managers that internal auditors are 
empowered to secure access to the various functional 
departments. Hence, the ease with which internal auditors 
perform    their    duties    is    a     reflection     of    senior 
 
 
 
 
management‟s sponsorship. Having access facilitated, 
internal auditors must keep senior managers informed of 
all activities it performs, and of the conclusions reached 
(Badara and Saidin, 2012). Reporting in the Malaysian 
public sector, Ahmad et al. (2009) observe management 
support to be the second highest contributor to internal 
audit effectiveness, and that with such support, sufficient 
resources are usually allocated for the function, and its 
recommendations implemented; whereas without it, a 
lack of commitment to independence on the part of 
internal auditors is likely. Further, it is also reported in 
studies conducted in the public sector that management 
support has a strong impact upon the effectiveness of the 
internal audit function, and management support is 
important as a construct in its own right but also via its 
links to issues of resourcing, competence and 
qualification, and independence (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 
2012; Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Mihret and Yismaw, 
2007). 
 
 
Internal audit activities 
 
Internal audit activities are also explored in the literature, 
specifically those included in the new IIA definition of the 
function. In this respect, several studies have considered 
the task of risk management now formally assigned to 
internal audit (Vijayakumar and Nagaraja, 2012; Mihret, 
2010), obtaining differing outcomes. In the USA, the new 
requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act relating to 
internal control and review, and disclosure, emphasize 
the need for internal auditors to step up to the challenge 
of doing more than the traditional duties of assurance. 
Yet, Gramling and Myers (2006) report that a half of all 
their sample of chief internal audit executives in the USA 
stated that they only spent up to 10% of their time and 
budget on risk management activities, whereas in their 
comparison of the situation in Belgian and US firms, 
Sarens and De Beelde (2006a) reveal a much greater 
impact on the part of internal auditors in risk management 
and control awareness. Furthermore, in large Italian 
companies it is seen that the IAF makes a sound 
contribution to the risk management process (Allegrini 
and D‟Onza, 2003), as do a large majority of internal 
auditors in Australian firms (Leung et al., 2003).  
Alongside risk management activities are those 
concerned with control, in which respect, Abbott et al. 
(2010) found a strongly positive link between oversight of 
the IAF by the audit committee and the amount of the 
budget devoted to internal controls-based activities; and 
in terms of consulting activities, it is seen that these have 
risen significantly in UK, Irish, and Italian internal audit 
departments (Selim et al., 2009). Within these consulting 
activities, the most common in the UK and Ireland are 
risk management, project management, governance, 
contingency planning and disaster recovery, whilst in 
Italy,  they  are  legislative  compliance,  governance  and 
 
 
 
 
risk management. Examining this issue across 15 Euro-
pean countries, Paape et al. (2003) found that 64% of 
chief internal audit executives were involved in con-
sultancy and management support activities. That said, 
the IAF appears to have little involvement in mergers, 
acquisitions, and divestitures (MAD) in USA and 
European firms (Selim et al., 2003). 
 
 
Interaction between audited organisations and 
external auditors 
 
Co-ordination and co-operation are essential between 
internal and external auditors to facilitate the overall 
process of audit and to raise the professional profile of 
the function (Messier et al., 2011). Activities such as joint 
planning, information exchange, reporting to each other, 
all prevent duplication of effort and develop mutual trust, 
ultimately accelerating the audit process. The internal/ 
external auditor relationship is a prime concern within the 
professional standards. The ISPPIA, Coordination 
Standard, for example considers that there should be at 
least information exchange and co-ordination in respect 
of the activities undertaken by each party. Building upon 
such a fundamental relationship, internal and external 
auditors should develop a professional and mutually 
trusting relationship, resulting in a more effective and 
quality-oriented audit. Trusted and comprehensive infor-
mation provided by the internal auditor helps the external 
auditor to work quicker as s/he is spared the need to 
delve deeply and has faith in the material provided. This 
in turn brings savings to the company concerned. In the 
absence of such fruitful interaction between the internal 
and external auditors, effectiveness of both the internal 
and external audit function is damaged, at least in the 
public sector (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2012; Gwilliam and 
El-Nafabi, 2002; Brierley et al., 2001). In the Saudi 
Arabian public sector context, it is found (Al-Garni, 2008; 
Almohaimeed, 2000) that the absence of co-operation 
between audited organisations and the GAB impairs the 
ability of external auditors to discharge their respon-
sibilities effectively, especially in respect of agreeing and 
implementing the GAB‟s recommendations. Furthermore, 
it is reported (Summary Reports of GAB, 2008, 2010) that 
the lack of such co-operation is directly responsible for 
repeated financial errors and irregularities. 
Whilst, these five dimensions of the IAF have been well 
researched, it is clear from the literature that most of the 
effort has been in the developed country context, and that 
a need exists for the body of knowledge to be 
supplemented with information concerning these internal 
audit aspects in developing countries. This study assists 
in satisfying that need. 
 
 
METHODS AND SAMPLING  
 
A qualitative approach was used to gain in-depth understanding of  
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the nature and characteristics of the IAF in the Saudi public sector, 
and consequently, interviews were conducted. Questions were built 
upon the general objectives of the study, and covered the main 
aspects including competence of the internal audit, independence 
of internal audit, management support for internal audit, internal 
audit activities and interaction between audited organisations and 
external auditors (who work for the GAB). A total of 29 face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews were undertaken with three groups: 9 
internal auditors, 10 general and senior managers in Saudi public 
sector organisations, and 10 external auditors working in the GAB. 
Different sets of interview questions relating to the principal 
variables under investigation were prepared for these groups, but 
within those sets there were a number of questions that were 
almost identical for each group.  
The duration of the interviews was between 15 and 90 min, 
although all the interviews were conducted, as far as possible, in 
the same way. This not only meant that the same questions were 
asked, but also sought to ensure that each interviewee would 
understand the questions in the same way. Moreover, interviewees 
were encouraged to expand on any issues that were of particular 
interest to them. With the help of tape recording the interview was 
explained to interviewees, and then interviewees were asked if they 
would allow this process. Almost all interviews were recorded but 
few interviewees (only two) were not prepared to agree to this, 
perhaps worried about having their responses formalized in this 
way. For those interviews that were not recorded, notes were taken 
during the interviews, and a full text was immediately written in 
Arabic after the interviews. 
Acknowledging the investment in time made by interviewees to 
the interview process was an important step in ensuring the 
success of the interviews. An appointment was made either on the 
phone or face-to-face with each interviewee before conducting the 
interview. This step was taken to 1) consider the time commitments 
of the interviewee; and 2) to ensure that the interviewee was not 
involved in any other task during the interview time and would thus 
be ready for the meeting. 
  The interviews were restricted to two cities, Riyadh and Jeddah, 
where large public sector organisations, independent and quasi-
independent organisations are located. These organisations are 
subject to audit by the GAB and are responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of national economic plans, administering and 
managing all the national service organisations, and constructing 
the national projects and schemes. Moreover, they are subject to 
investigation by the GAB auditors, and are considered large in 
terms of the budget received and the number of employees. Hence, 
they make a contribution to the country‟s economy, strategic plans 
and education. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Competence of internal audit  
 
It was unanimously confirmed that the lack of qualified 
staff stands represents one of the most important 
problems facing internal audit in the Saudi public sector. 
Several reasons were offered for this situation, including 
staff recruitment, educational qualifications, professional 
qualifications, work experience and continuous develop-
ment. 
 
 
Staff recruitment 
 
Twenty   six    interviewees   indicated   poor   recruitment  
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procedures and criteria in respect of internal audit staff. 
The selection process for such staff is performed 
randomly based on the choice of either the general 
manager of financial management or the head of internal 
audit. As examples, one interviewee stated: “there are no 
adequate rules for recruitment” (M9), and another (M4) 
said that the head of the department responsible for 
recruitment uses his own procedures of favouritism 
through which “he chooses his friends”. Moreover, 
analysis of the interviews showed that the selection 
process in respect of internal audit staff was based on 
reputation and relationship with top management, for 
example: 
 
The criterion used in the selection process of internal 
auditors does not relate to education or work experience, 
but […] to friendship and having a good relationship with 
the top management team including the head of the 
internal audit department in order to be an internal auditor 
(M3). 
 
This absence of recruitment procedures and criteria is 
addressed in the IAR (2007), Articles 4 and 5 which 
highlight the important criteria to be met when appointing 
a head of internal audit, and internal audit staff. Article 4 
does specify the number of years of work experience 
required of the head of internal audit, but Article 5 relating 
to internal audit staff, refers only to the need for relevant 
work experience (without specification of the required 
length), and it permits organisations to appoint diploma 
holders without any reference to a minimum length of 
work experience. Moreover, this Article pays no attention 
to the knowledge, skills, and other competencies required 
by internal auditors to effectively perform their respon-
sibilities. Nor does it consider the outcome of the 
appointment of individuals who are not qualified to 
discharge the duties assigned to them. This deficiency in 
the IAR may be one reason for the different views among 
organizations in their selection of internal audit staff, and 
the fact that some organizations choose these personnel 
haphazardly, merely to comply with the resolution. 
Another reason for inappropriate selection of internal 
audit staff is the simple fact that there may be insufficient 
qualified people available, so even if suitable selection 
criteria were in operation, the problem of the lack of 
expertise and appointments made on the wrong basis 
remains. 
 
 
Educational qualifications 
 
The educational qualifications possessed by internal 
audit staff are generally of a low calibre. A total of 21 
interviewees confirmed this, and identified several rea-
sons. One interviewee (M10) indicated that the practice 
of transferring staff from other departments to the internal 
audit  department  provided the opportunity to “get  rid  of  
 
 
 
 
the worst staff” as “heads of other departments would not 
release good staff”; and. M18, who majored in a field not 
related to auditing work, noted that he was transferred to 
the internal audit department “under a request from 
general financial manager” and that he “cannot reject the 
manager’s request”. He added that the acceptance of the 
transfer was “part of the co-operation with management”. 
Another interviewee raised a separate issue relating to 
the fact that a transfer might be the only way to obtain 
promotion even though the individual concerned had no 
relevant auditing qualification. Seven interviewees linked 
this to the lack of support from the MoF as it “is not 
supporting organisations by providing new posts”. 
 
 
Professional qualifications 
 
Professional certification (example CIA, CPA) is 
considered an important indicator of technical proficiency 
(Tarr, 2002; Lewington, 1996; Myers and Gramling, 1997; 
Felts, 1994), but sadly, interviewees revealed that 
internal auditors did not possess any such qualification. 
Indeed, they indicated that such professional qualifi-
cations are not fully recognised in the public sector, for 
example M2 stated “the MCS does not co-operate in 
recognising the professional qualifications, and it does 
not give the professional qualifications the appropriate 
classification”. Furthermore, interview responses from 
members of both the MoF and the MCS suggested a lack 
of understanding of the importance of having qualified 
staff to perform the internal audit function as “it is all 
simple daily transactions” and there is no need for 
holders of “professional qualifications”. 
Another issue may be that the level of educational 
qualification creates ineligibility to sit for such exami-
nations (to qualify as a Saudi CPA it is necessary to hold 
an accounting degree – but this is not the case for the 
CIA qualification). However it is possibly that to date, the 
importance of professional qualification has not yet been 
fully appreciated in the Saudi work environment. 
A more specific consideration is that there is no 
separate national internal audit qualification. The Saudi 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
has developed the CPA, but it has not established an 
internal audit qualification for either the private or public 
sector. One reason might be that the SOCPA and Saudi 
Accounting Association (SAA) emphasize accounting and 
public accountants rather than the internal audit function 
(Al-Twaijry, 2000). 
 
 
Work experience 
 
Twenty four interviewees commented on the absence of 
sufficient experience irrespective of qualifications held; 
for example, “Currently, there are no members of staff 
qualified   to   carry   out  internal   audit  duties  and  staff  
 
 
 
 
experience is not related to internal audit work” (M22). 
Four interviewees believed that work experience would 
naturally be gained while performing the internal audit 
work, one in particular saying: “a university degree is the 
most important thing as experience is of minor 
importance because the staff will obtain the experience 
when undertaking the work” (M17). 
Another explanatory factor might be that internal audit 
in the Saudi public sector is a relatively new pheno-
menon, and therefore, it is not surprising that many 
individuals performing internal audit work are relatively 
inexperienced. In many countries with a longer history 
and experience of internal audit, internal audit is not 
necessarily seen as a lifelong career by those working in 
the field (in the same way that external audit is only a 
lifelong career for a relative small percentage of those 
working as external auditors). However, it may be that the 
practice of rotating employees around departments con-
tributes to a relatively high level of staff turnover – and 
also the absence of specific criteria in the IAR regarding 
the extent of experience necessary to fulfil internal audit 
roles below that of departmental head. 
 
 
Continuous development 
 
Continuing development and training of internal audit 
staff is addressed in Article 9 of the IAR, which states that 
the head of the internal audit department should prepare 
a training plan for staff and that this plan should be 
approved by the first official of the organisation. The plan 
should contain details of the location and timing of the 
training and the content should be designed according to 
the training need. At the international level, the IIA 
recommends that internal auditors should complete 80 h 
of acceptable continuous professional education (CPE) 
every two years (IIA, 2000),that is, an average of 40 h 
each year. However, analysis of the interview data 
revealed that there is a shortage of development and 
training programmes and too few opportunities to attend 
such training that did exist. To take an example, one 
interviewee said: 
 
The quality of the staff is very low. Since most of them 
just have high school qualification, they need training to 
become sufficiently competent to carry out their duties 
efficiently. Internal auditors don’t have the chance to 
attend either training programmes or conferences abroad 
to develop their skills (M5). 
 
Interviewees identified several reasons for the lack of 
training, including financial issues (example, the amount 
allocated for training staff), shortage of internal audit-
related programmes available to internal auditors, and a 
small number of internal audit staff such that the head of 
department might not allow staff to attend such training 
because   of    the   department‟s    inability   to   continue  
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operating during their absence. Another explanatory 
factor might be that to date, there is no specific training 
centre for either internal auditors or accountants in public 
sector organisations as a whole. 
Given the relative paucity of professional qualifications 
(and that internal auditors possessed either only high 
school educational qualifications or a non-relevant 
degree), and the low levels of work experience, there 
does appear to be scope for a greater focus on the need 
to upgrade the skills of internal audit personnel via 
continuing professional training and development. 
Organisations should pay more attention to developing 
the skills of those without adequate educational or work 
experience in the field of internal auditing. 
This lack of qualified staff was seen as one of the 
reasons for the absence of an audit plan. Eight 
interviewees indicated that the low level of educational 
qualifications and lack of training influenced the 
preparation of such plan, one saying: “Internal auditors 
need more training to improve their skills in order to be 
able to prepare plans (M21)”. Another interviewee stated 
that “internal auditors have high school qualifications and 
cannot design any such plan because they do not know 
how to do this” (M23). 
 
 
Independence and objectivity of internal audit 
 
Interviewees explained that it is difficult for internal 
auditors in the Saudi public sector to achieve indepen-
dence as they are employees of the organisation they 
audit, and essentially the IAF has no real organisational 
status. There are issues around the reporting level, 
freedom of enquiry, the provision of non-audit activity, 
and the relationships with auditees. It was confirmed by 
all interviewees that whilst internal auditors have their 
own separate departments in the organisational structure, 
these departments, nonetheless, operate under the 
administrative leadership of lower level managers. 
Additionally, the interviewees identified a diversity of 
practice concerning the location of the department within 
the organisation. In one instance, internal audit was 
located under the General Manager of Financial 
Management, as reported by M3, who said: “Internal 
audit is working under the General Manager of Financial 
Management. If internal audit marginalises the general 
manager, the internal auditors would be in trouble”. 
 
It was revealed that internal audit report to the same level 
in which they are placed in the organisational structure. 
This is a situation required by the Saudi culture which 
operates norms concerning organisational status and 
reporting levels, these being that staff are not allowed to 
marginalise their managers. Indeed, if an employee 
bypasses his/her immediate manager, problems can 
occur because high power distance forbids any staff, 
whether  internal  auditors  or   otherwise,  from  reporting  
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directly to top level management when there is a chain of 
command below that level. M4 explained this situation, 
saying: “Internal audit cannot jump over the deputy since 
it works under him in the organisational structure. If one 
of my staff ignores me and goes to a higher manager, I 
will transfer him to another department. Each staff 
member must respect his direct manager”. 
Almost all interviewees indicated a significant gap bet-
ween the theoretical and the actual reporting structures, 
with M5 pointing out that “theoretically, the internal audit 
department is placed under the President of the 
organisation, but in reality, it works under the Vice-
President”. 
According to the IAR, the internal audit should be 
placed at the highest point of the organisational hierarchy 
reporting to the first official of the organisation, but the 
interview data showed a lack of adherence to the IAR. 
Reasons for the differences in the organisational 
structure and reporting level as indicated by the inter-
viewees included the possibility of the marginalisation of 
the manager responsible for financial matters if the 
internal auditor reports to someone other than to him. 
Also, there is the question of delegation and assignment 
of authority from the highest level of management which 
may be too busy to deal with the auditors. Clearly, 
though, there is a misunderstanding of the role of internal 
audit and its main duties, since the requirements for the 
effective performance of internal audit are not met by the 
prevailing structural obstacles in Saudi Arabia. 
In addition to the above reasons, twenty one inter-
viewees indicated two other main causes of the restricted 
access faced by internal auditors in respect of their ability 
to meet with personnel and to obtain the relevant 
information needed to fulfil their duties. These reasons 
are: 1) auditees who are involved in confidential work are 
unwilling to share this with the internal audit team, as 
shown by the comment “there are some confidential 
documents. We cannot easily allow anybody to see 
these” (M10), and 2) employees at certain levels of 
authority had immunity and were thus not subject to any 
type of audit, as noted by M7 who said, “internal auditors 
cannot investigate and raise queries with some staff in 
special positions … who have immunity”. Moreover, it 
was observed that even when the internal audit was 
located at a relatively senior managerial level, it might still 
be subject to pressure from more highly placed manage-
ment. For instance, internal auditors could be prevented 
from exploring a particular issue simply by higher 
management directing them to examine a different one. 
Simultaneously, top level managers control organi-
sational resources which they may withhold to prevent an 
in-depth investigation by internal auditors of a matter 
which they do not want to be probed. In any situation 
where the internal audit is prevented from examining an 
item of business that falls within its jurisdiction, there is 
likely to be an element of interference from some parties, 
whether  this  be the  actual  auditees or a  higher level of  
 
 
 
 
management that does not wish certain particulars to be 
uncovered. Consequently, where it is not possible to hide 
misdemeanours, enhanced effectiveness can be 
achieved, but this is dependent upon top management 
support in ensuring that access to all information and 
personnel is made available for the internal audit team. 
Some other reasons for the challenge to the indepen-
dence of internal audit emerged as being the relationship 
between auditees and auditors. For example, personal 
biases and expectations brought the potential to destroy 
independence, in particular in respect to the audit of the 
personnel department, where an inherent tension existed 
because of the power of personnel staff to approve the 
promotion of internal auditors. Moreover, the strong 
social networking characteristic of Saudi Arabian society 
promotes relationships within the workplace which 
destroy objectivity on the part of internal auditors who are 
unable, through mistaken loyalty, to give a truthful 
opinion. 
 
 
Management support for internal audit 
 
Interviewees reported that internal audit suffers from a 
lack of support from top management. Resistance to the 
establishment of internal audit has created a negative 
attitude towards internal audit and consequently, low 
levels of support. Several reasons were offered for the 
perceived absence of management support. These 
included: ignorance on the part of top level management 
regarding the importance of the internal audit role and 
lack of attention paid thereto; the organisational status of 
internal audit which consequently affected its indepen-
dence; and general organisational resistance to the idea 
of establishing an internal audit function. Moreover, 
external auditors also agreed that internal audit did not 
receive sufficient support from the highest officials of the 
organisations. M20 pointed out that “there is not sufficient 
support for internal audit”, and he considered this as one 
of the reasons for the lack of independence. In addition, 
M21 and M27 indicated that internal audit might not be 
effective since the highest official did not adopt the 
concept of internal audit, not being “enthusiastic to 
support internal audit” (M27). Further, M25 believed that 
lack of support affected the competence of the 
department, saying “internal audit will not have qualified 
staff as long as it does not receive sufficient support from 
top management”. 
Other findings emerging from the interview responses 
(and these were not only confined to the perceptions of 
internal auditor interviewees) were that internal audit was 
affected by problems with regard to budget constraints, 
limited number of internal audit staff and lack of 
necessary equipment (that is computers, photocopying 
machines and faxes). The interview results suggested 
that these problems could be attributed to insufficient 
support from  management, and a more general belief on  
 
 
 
 
behalf of managers that the level of resources possessed 
by the internal audit was satisfactory.  
Certainly, the absence of support from top manage-
ment affected the budget allocated to the internal 
auditand the number of staff available to conduct internal 
audit work. However, the interviewees considered that 
the limited budget and the insufficient staff members 
were general problems affecting all departments and not 
only internal audit. Such problems were attributed to the 
lack of co-operation from the MoF as the body controlling 
government financial matters and posts. 
Since lack of posts and staff are general problems 
facing organisations, transferring staff from one 
department to the internal audit department creates a 
shortage in that department and consequently staff may 
be returned to their original departments whenever they 
are needed. Finally, the IAR does not specify the 
importance of allocating sufficient resources to ensure 
the effective discharge of internal audit duties. 
The interview responses suggested that internal audit 
reporting to a lower level than appropriate and a general 
lack of management support for internal audit were the 
main reasons for internal audit recommendations not 
being implemented. M18 described much of the work of 
internal audit as a waste of time as it does not receive 
sufficient support from the first official and consequently 
many internal audit recommendations are not imple-
mented. He said: “the main problem that our department 
(internal audit) faces is complete ignorance from the 
highest official. It is a waste of time since we receive no 
attention and our recommendations are in vain”. 
 
 
Internal audit activities 
 
The interviewees were unanimous that the internal audit 
activities had not expanded beyond the traditional audit of 
financial regularity and compliance; and that the primary 
work of internal audit continues to focus on the traditional 
roles of internal audit in terms of concentrating on the 
reliability of financial records and compliance with 
procedures and regulations. M3, for example, said “[i]t 
(internal audit) is focusing on the extent of compliance 
with regulations and policies as well as reviewing the 
accuracy and reliability of the financial accounts”. 
In fact, staff shortages were blamed for restrictions on 
the type of activities that internal audit might perform, as 
noted by M17, who said “I am the only one who works in 
the department and I cannot carry out all the required 
works. It is frustrating to be the only one in the 
department and perform the entire work”. In fact, 12 
interviewees complained that the absence of qualified 
staff prevented expansion of internal audit activities. That 
said, 16 interviewees pointed to a misunderstanding of 
the role of internal audit as one reason for narrowing the 
focus of its activities merely to checking the reliability of 
financial records  and  compliance  with  procedures  and  
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regulations. Examples of comments in this respect were 
offered as follows: 
 
To date, some organisations are not aware of the internal 
audit function.  There is still a misunderstanding between 
the duties of internal audit and those of the Follow-up 
department. They cannot differentiate between the two 
departments (M23). 
 
There is a misunderstanding of the role of internal audit 
and the regulation issued by the GAB; some 
organisations still see internal audit as a pure financial 
audit (M20). 
 
In those instances where non-audit activities were per-
formed, and this was indicated by 9 interviewees, such 
activities took different forms, including conducting 
financial tasks, participating in budget work, working in 
other departments where there are staff shortages, and 
being involved with committees that perform work at a 
distance to internal audit. M11, for example, stated that 
internal auditors “carry out financial activities when there 
is shortage of staff in the other financial departments”. 
Non-audit work may also be requested by top 
management or occur because internal audit work is 
placed directly under the supervision of financial manage-
ment, and in such situations, internal auditors might be 
assigned to any financial work whether related to auditing 
or not. A refusal by an internal auditor to perform such 
work might result in transfer to another department and a 
low grade in the annual performance evaluation. Hence, 
internal auditors seek to please top management by 
complying with their wishes. 
 
 
The interaction between external auditors and 
audited organisations 
 
A weak relationship was seen to exist between external 
auditors and audited organisations, and in particular such 
a relationship does not exist with internal auditors. 
Interviewees indicated several influences in this respect, 
the first and perhaps the most important being the 
ingrained mutually negative attitude towards each other. 
One interviewee described external auditors as police-
men since “they look only for mistakes; they act as police 
investigators”. Another interviewee described their work 
as looking for “thieves”. Strong negative attitudes of this 
kind seem to have resulted in inflexible behaviour, 
consequently depressing any willingness to respond 
appropriately to audit recommendations. Moreover, the 
presence of such attitudes can easily become infectious 
within organisations such that others who are not actually 
involved with internal audit adopt the same position, or 
that senior managers themselves prevent others within 
the organisation from co-operating with the GAB.  
A second factor with potential  to  weaken  the  relation- 
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ship is the limited implementation of recommendations 
made by the external auditor. Interviewees revealed their 
opinions that GAB recommendations are not imple-
mented, for several reasons, these being: 1) mutual 
negative attitude; 2) out-dated recommendations “They 
send a report about something that happened two or 
three years ago … how come I remember something that 
happened three years ago?” (M10); 3) absence of 
discussion of the findings and recommendations of the 
external auditors, for example, one interviewee said “the 
GAB sends its report and requests implementation of 
everything in the report without listening to our opinions” 
(M6). Here it might be suggested that allowing the 
audited organisations, particularly internal audit staff, to 
add comments and opinions on the content of the audit 
findings and recommendations might minimise the 
amount of resistance and consequently improve the 
extent of implementations of audit recommendations; 4) 
absence of periodic meetings – and here again more 
frequent meetings might also open the channels to 
discuss the mutual interests and audit findings. This was 
pointed out by six interviewees, for example: “we do not 
have official meetings with the external auditor. It is only 
a relationship on paper; we send him the papers and 
records that he requests, that is it” (M4); 5) complex 
procedures, outdated regulations and instruction - which 
might affect organisations‟ performance and cones-
quently result in them repeating the same errors and 
irregularities every year, thus ignoring audit findings as 
they are the same as previous years, for example “we 
receive the same findings and the same recom-
mendations every year; there is nothing to discuss. It all 
happened because of the complexity of the system. 
Regulations and in instructions have never been updated. 
Nothing new; every year we do the same thing, and they 
(external auditors) report the same findings”(M9); 6) 
absence of support from top management in the audited 
organisations and absence of accountability “the most 
important reason is the absence of accountability” (M23) - 
which would create a climate in which it might be seen as 
possible to ignore external audit recommendations with 
impunity; and 7) having immunity such that no reper-
cussions befall auditees who do not implement the 
recommendations, for example “Employees are guaran-
teed that nothing will happen to them if they do not 
implement the recommendations” (M24). 
Thirdly, the lack of qualified staff working within audited 
organisations might be a relevant factor. Five inter-
viewees attributed the weak relationship to the lack of 
qualified staff, for example, M24 raised this issue, saying 
“staff are not sufficiently competent to co-operate”. 
A final factor might be related to the standards and 
regulations issued by the GAB. Worldwide professional 
auditing standards highlight the importance of this 
relationship, but the latest version of the Government 
Auditing Standards (GAS) issued by the GAB in 2008 
makes no reference  thereto.  Although  this  version  was  
 
 
 
 
released after the issuance of the IAR (2007), it pays no 
attention to a number of related aspects including: 1) the 
new regulation of internal audit; 2) the relationship 
between internal and external auditors, in terms of co-
ordination, reliance on internal audit work by external 
auditor, sharing working papers, and the need for 
frequent meetings; and 3) evaluating the objectivity of the 
internal audit function, the expertise of the internal 
auditors, quality and effectiveness of internal audit work, 
and the scope of work. The absence of consideration of 
these issues is likely to weaken the relationship between 
the two audit parties given that external auditors are 
required to comply with the GAS when performing audit 
work. The GAB (2008) indicated that several conside-
rations were borne in mind when updating the latest 
version of its standards, one of these being the IAR. 
However, internal audit is mentioned only in one place in 
these standards (page 38) where there is a reference to 
internal audit as one of the five components of internal 
control. 
The GAB (2008) indicated adherence in their content 
with the INTOSAI standards, but these (1998) highlight 
the importance of the relationship between internal and 
external auditors, whereas the GAS do not. With regard 
to the auditor‟s working papers, the GAS emphasized the 
importance of keeping these confidential, stipulating that 
the “GAB is the official owner of all working papers with 
all its contents” (GAB, 2008). Article 14 states that the 
“GAB must take all the required procedures to keep all 
organisations‟ information confidential”. In the current 
study, the interviewees indicated that the reason for not 
sharing the external audit working papers was confi-
dentiality. 
 
 
Summary and review of findings 
 
This study provides evidence on the current practice of 
internal audit in public sector organisations in Saudi 
Arabia that is subject to audit by the GAB. From this 
evidence it is seen that institutional factors are likely to 
play a part in the failure of internal audit to develop in the 
Saudi public sector. The existence of the state-required 
„Follow-up department‟, „auditing department‟, and  
„Financial Representative (Controller)‟ have been seen, 
rightly or wrongly, as functioning to undertake the ascri-
bed role of internal audit in the public sector and thereby 
to make internal audit as a separate function, redundant. 
Additionally, the perception exists that powerful gover-
nment bodies, in particular the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
and the Ministry of Civil Service (MCS) fail to appreciate 
the value of internal audit as a mechanism to improve 
efficiency and probity within the public sector, and 
therefore have not sought to enforce the requirements 
universally. The failure of internal audit to develop and 
flourish in the Saudi public sector, to a level of activity 
and   importance   which   theoretically,   holds    in   other 
 
 
 
 
countries, may be seen as a reflection of the historical 
background against which accountability, monitoring and 
control of public finances has developed in Saudi Arabia. 
Beyond this, and in common with other societies 
emerging from a long history of close families or „clan‟ 
relationships (and also perhaps an overarching religious 
structure), the basic perception within employment is the 
maintenance of harmony with friends and colleagues, 
and this might be seen as militating against the effective 
discharge of an internal audit function (and also has 
implications for the role of external audit and audit 
committees) which is intended to impose control and 
expose those responsible for financial misdemeanours. 
The fear of repercussions within a clearly structured and 
hierarchical environment, which, it might be argued, is 
also a mark of Saudi society, may impair internal auditor 
independence beyond the more straightforward conven-
tional concerns as to employment by the „auditee‟ body 
and enhance the wider behavioural, psychological and 
behavioural issues common to almost all forms of audit, 
as discussed by Marnet (2008). All these cultural pre-
dispositions combine to produce a situation where 
internal audit is neither effective nor given sufficient 
credence and importance - issues identified by other 
researchers (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2012; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007; Al-Twaijry, 2000). 
Against this background, a number of recommend-
dations are made as to the manner in which internal audit 
and the regulatory framework underpinning internal audit 
might develop if the function is to more adequately fulfil 
its ascribed role within the Saudi public sector. Wider 
transparency, in terms of making public external audit 
findings of the GAB, is also advocated together with the 
provision of more resources to support education and 
training of both management and internal audit staff at all 
stages including higher education and professional 
qualifications. The relative lack of progress of internal 
audit in the Saudi public sector to date may be attributed 
to a „catching up‟ process with a much shorter tradition of 
public sector control and audit than many others. Here 
facilitation of education, training etc. may act to reduce 
miscommunication between the various stakeholders, 
misperceptions as to the nature of the internal audit role 
and perhaps influence management to provide more 
support and encouragement for the active pursuit of that 
role. It is also suggested that if the Saudi public sector 
moves toward a model with a greater influence of 
markets and more direct input from stakeholders, as has 
been the case in the great majority of developed indu-
strial nations over the last thirty years, then this too is 
likely to create forces which will act to move audit more 
toward the current model in such developed countries. 
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